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Abstract
This paper constructs an overlapping generations model with a frictional la-
bor market to explain persistent low education in developing countries. When
parents are uneducated, their children often face diﬃculties in finishing school
and therefore are likely to remain uneducated. Moreover, if children expect that
other children of the same generation will not receive an education, they expect
that firms will not create enough jobs for educated workers, and thus are fur-
ther discouraged from schooling. These intergenerational and intragenerational
mechanisms reinforce each other, creating a serious poverty trap. Escape from
the trap requires the well-organized and combined implementation of a subsidy
for schooling, the provision of free education, support for disadvantaged children,
and public awareness programs.
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1 Introduction
In low-income countries with a GNI per capita of $580 or less, the gross school en-
rollment rate for secondary education was only 45% in 2004 (World Bank 2006). This
low enrollment rate implies that the majority of the workforce works in less productive
sectors and earns low incomes, and this keeps these countries in poverty. Why then has
the enrollment rate remained low? This paper develops a theory of persistent poverty
and low education, focusing on both the transmission of educational attainment be-
tween generations and on the strategic complementarity in schooling choice within the
same generation.
When the parents in a family are relatively uneducated, the home environment may
be less favorable to study than otherwise, and in that case, children find it diﬃcult
to obtain an education. Recent microeconomic empirical studies strongly support
the argument that parents’ (in particular, the mother’s) education status is one of
the most important determinants of school enrollment and child labor, whereas the
wealth level of the household has a relatively minor eﬀect (e.g., Kurosaki et al. 2006,
Bratti 2007).1 Thus, diﬀerential home environments generate an intergenerational
transmission mechanism through which low educational attainment is inherited from
one generation to the next.
In contrast, frictions in labor markets can create a strategic complementarity in
schooling choice among children of the same generation. To see this, suppose that the
majority of other children in the same generation do not receive an education. In such
an economy, a child expects that firms find it diﬃcult to get appropriately educated
workers and will not create many jobs that require education.2 On this basis, the child
will be discouraged in seeking education because they can rationally anticipate that it
will be diﬃcult to find a high-paying job, even when they receive an education.3 This
suggests that a low enrollment rate may be a result of an intragenerational coordination
failure, where children do not receive an education because others do not.
This paper develops a simple overlapping generations model that incorporates both
the intergenerational transmission mechanism and the intragenerational coordination
1See also Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) and Antonovics and Goldberger (2005).
2Empirical studies have found that foreign direct investment (FDI) is likely to be attracted by
countries with higher average schooling years (e.g., Blonigen et al. 2007). This finding is consistent
with our viewpoint, as in low-income countries, jobs that require skilled workers are often created by
foreign firms in the form of FDI.
3For instance, Wakabayasi (1998) found that poor employment opportunities discouraged parents
from sending their children to secondary school based on interviews conducted in poor communities
of the Roi-Et province in Thailand.
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problem, and shows that the interaction of those two mechanisms can create a serious
poverty trap. In fact, when only one of these two mechanisms is present, the economy
can escape the poverty with little policy intervention. Even among uneducated parents,
some will maintain a good family environment and therefore the rate of educational
attainment will increase gradually over generations. Even when the coordination fail-
ure problem is present, it does not rule out the possibility that children choose another
good equilibrium. However, when these mechanisms are present simultaneously, they
reinforce each other: low educational attainment in the previous generation necessar-
ily causes coordination failure, and coordination failure makes the intergenerational
mechanism more persistent. As a result, the economy is “dually” poverty trapped.
An economy can be saved from this trap only by well-organized policy packages
that simultaneously solve the intergenerational and the intragenerational problems.
We show that an appropriate policy package generally comprises several steps and
each stage requires multiple policy instruments, including education subsidies, provi-
sion of free education, support for children in diﬃcult home environments, and public
awareness campaigns. Conversely, if the authority aims to solve only one of the prob-
lems, it will fail to even partially resolve the problem targeted. This could be one of
the reasons why various forms of development assistance have been unsuccessful (see
Easterly (2008) for a recent survey).
Our paper relates to a number of other papers. Many studies explain the low-
education poverty trap in terms of credit market imperfections (e.g., Galor and Zeira
1993; Banerjee and Newman 1993). However, the limited success of student loan
systems in low-income countries suggests that the credit market is not the only source
of the problem. Complementing this body of work, our model shows the emergence
of a persistent poverty trap under complete credit markets. Both in the economic
development and growth literature, a number of studies analyzed the consequences of
the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment and human capital.4 To
name just a few, Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Moav (2005) showed the possibility
of a poverty trap by combining the intergenerational transmission mechanism with
certain sorts of nonconvexities assumed in the model (e.g., threshold externalities),
while we combine it with the frictional labor market. Our study also relates to Laing,
Parivos, and Wang (1995), Takii (1997), Acemoglu (1997), and Burdett and Smith
(2002), who showed that coordination failure problems in the frictional labor market
may generate multiple equilibria. While the low-education equilibrium may be chosen
by chance in these studies, our model explains why the economy necessarily falls into
the low-education equilibrium when the intergenerational mechanism is present. This
4See, for example, the textbook by De la Croix and Michel (2002, Section 5.2).
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paper also diﬀers in that we focus on the strategic complementarity between children
of the same generation rather than the strategic complementarity between workers and
firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
overlapping generations model and derives the schooling choices of children. Section
3 introduces a frictional labor market and derives the job creation decisions of firms.
Section 4 investigates the equilibrium dynamics of the economy and explains why a
“dual” poverty trap emerges. In Section 5, we consider three types of eﬀective policy
packages depending on the various situations. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix
discusses an alternative labor market setting.
2 Behavior of Individuals
Consider an overlapping generations economy where each agent lives for two periods:
childhood and adulthood. In adulthood, agents can be either educated or uneducated,
depending on whether they received an education during their childhood. Each adult
agent has exactly one child, so that the number of agents in each generation is constant.
We normalize the number of agents in each generation to unity.
2.1 Childhood
The life of an agent born in period t is as follows. Let et denote the number (or
equivalently, fraction) of educated adult agents (parents) in period t. Then et children
are born to educated parents, and 1− et children are born to uneducated parents. In
the first period of their life, agents choose whether to attend school. If agents want to
become educated in adulthood, they must attend school and pay a certain amount of
eﬀort (education is indivisible). The amount of eﬀort needed to finish schooling varies
among agents, partly because of their own home environment. In particular, each
child’s home environment depends on their parents’ educational attainment. When
compared with educated parents, uneducated parents may be weaker in providing
eﬀective preschool training for their children, may be less concerned with maintaining
a good environment for their children to study, and/or may be reluctant to send their
children to school. Regardless, children of these parents find it diﬃcult to obtain an
education. We assume that among (1 − et) agents born to uneducated parents, a
fraction p (0 < p < 1) faces such diﬃculties. Specifically, among the unit population of
generation t children, p(1− et) are “children in diﬃcult environments” who face a very
high eﬀort cost of obtaining an education and therefore never receive an education.
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The remaining 1 − p + pet agents in this generation, i.e., those born to educated
parents plus the fraction 1 − p of those born to uneducated parents, are “children
in good environments” who can obtain an education with little eﬀort: we assume,
for simplicity, this has zero disutility. However, there is still an opportunity cost of
obtaining an education. Agents attending school will earn no income in their childhood,
while those not attending school can do some simple job that pays z > 0 units of goods.
2.2 Adulthood
In the second period of their life (period t+1), agents can work either in the modern or
the traditional sector. In the modern sector, production takes place when a firm and
a worker meet and agree to a division of output. Each pair of a firm and an educated
worker produces bye units of goods, whereas each pair of a firm and an uneducated
worker produces a smaller amount, byu < bye. The labor market in the modern sector is
frictional and adult agents must search for a vacant job in a firm. For simplicity, we
do not consider separate labor markets for educated and uneducated workers–they
search for a vacant job in the same pooled market and find one with the same proba-
bility.5 This assumption is relaxed in Appendix A. The probability of an adult agent
successfully matching with a vacancy is denoted by qt+1 ∈ [0, 1], which is endogenous
(to be explained in Section 3), but taken as given by each agent. If an adult agent fails
to match with any vacancy in the modern sector, they work in the traditional sector
where an employment position is easy to find with no friction. In that case, they earn
x ≤ byu.
When an adult agent matches with a vacancy in a firm, the agent and the firm
negotiate the division of the output. If the matched pair fails to agree to the division
of output, the agent must then work in the traditional sector, where they can earn x,
whereas the firm gets nothing from the vacant job. We assume that multiple contacts
between agents and firms are not allowed in the same period. Given this, and assuming
that both parties have equal bargaining power, the matched pair reaches the Nash
bargaining solution as follows. When the matched agent is educated, the firm obtains
ye ≡ (bye − x)/2 and the educated agent’s income is ye + x. If the matched agent is
uneducated, the firm obtains yu ≡ (byu − x)/2 and the uneducated agent’s income is
5This assumption can be justified if firms cannot distinguish between educated and uneducated
agents until they match with a worker. In other words, the search process is undirected, as shown in
Acemoglu (2001) Alternatively, we can consider a directed search process in which firms can distinguish
between educated and uneducated agents before the match and therefore only search for educated
workers. In Appendix A, we show that the latter setting yields the same outcome if it is more costly
for firms to search for an educated worker in an economy with a smaller fraction of educated workers.
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yu + x.
2.3 Schooling Decision
Recall that there are 1 − p + pet children in good environments, who can obtain an
education without disutility. They choose to attend school if and only if it yields
an expected lifetime income at least as high as what they would have obtained by
not attending school.6 If an agent born in period t chooses not to attend school,
they will earn z in the first period, and their second period income is yu + x with
probability qt+1 and x with probability 1 − qt+1. Therefore, the expected lifetime
income is z + β [qt+1(yu + x) + (1− qt+1)yu], where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount
factor. If an agent decides to become educated, they must abandon their first-period
income but may earn a higher income in the second period with probability qt+1; in
this case, the expected lifetime income is β [qt+1(ye + x) + (1− qt+1)x] . We assume
that there is a significant productivity gap between educated and uneducated workers
in the modern sector. Specifically, y ≡ ye − yu is assumed to be larger than z/β,
otherwise children choose not to attend school, even if the probability of matching
equals one. The net benefit of receiving an education, i.e., the diﬀerence between the
above two lifetime incomes, is −z + βqt+1y.
Note that the agents born in period t decide whether to attend school in their
childhood, while the probability of finding a job in period in t + 1 (qt+1) is yet to be
determined. Therefore, their decision is based on their expectation of qt+1 as of period
t, which is denoted by Et[qt+1]. They receive an education if the expected net benefit
−z + βEt[qt+1]y is zero or higher, which holds when Et[qt+1] ≥ z/βy.
The following summarizes the schooling decision. There are 1− p+ pet children in
good environments who receive an education if and only if Et[qt+1] ≥ z/βy. Children
in diﬃcult environments never receive an education. Therefore, the number of adult
agents who become educated in period t+ 1 is
et+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if Et[qt+1] < z/βy,
1− p+ pet if Et[qt+1] ≥ z/βy.
(1)
Equation (1) describes how the expected probability of finding a job determines the
number of educated workers supplied to the period t+1 labor market. Given this, the
following section examines how the actual probability of finding a job is determined in
the frictional labor market.
6For simplicity, we assume that the agents’ utility function is linear (i.e., agents are risk neutral)
or the economy considered is an open economy. In either case, the discount factor is exogenous and
constant. It is also assumed that agents receive an education when they are indiﬀerent in doing so.
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3 Matching Technology and Job Creation
As described in section 2.2, a search-matching friction exists in the modern sector. Let
`t+1 denote the number of workers who search for a vacant job and vt+1 represent the
number of vacant jobs in period t+1. The number of matches in a period is then given
by a standard Cobb—Douglas matching function,
M(`t+1, vt+1) = min
©
A`1−ηt+1 v
η
t+1, `t+1, vt+1
ª
, (2)
where A, η ∈ (0, 1) are the parameters of the matching technology. Observe that in
equation (2), the number of matches is bounded above by the number of workers and
the number of vacant jobs, because workers and firms can match each other at most
once each period.
Recall from the previous section that all adult agents, with population one, search
for vacancies in the modern sector because the income there (either ye+x or yu+x) is
higher than the income in the traditional sector (x). This means that `t+1 = 1. From
this, the probability of a worker matching with a vacant job is given by
qt+1 =M(`t+1, vt+1)/`t+1 =M(1, vt+1)/1 = min
©
Avηt+1, 1, vt+1
ª
. (3)
Equation (3) shows that probability qt+1 is determined by the number of vacant
jobs vt+1. In this economy, through free entry firms create vacant jobs with a constant
cost of k ∈ (yu, ye), and these, filled or not, deteriorate in one period. Recall that if
a vacant job is matched with an educated worker, the firm’s revenue is ye, whereas it
is yu when matched with an uneducated worker. Because firms are randomly matched
with workers, the conditional probability that the matched worker is educated (or une-
ducated) upon matching is et (or 1− et). Therefore, the expected revenue, conditional
upon the vacant job being matched with a worker is et+1ye+(1− et+1)yu = et+1y+ yu,
where y ≡ ye − yu.
If et+1y + yu < k, or equivalently if et+1 < (k − yu)/y, the firm’s expected revenue
from a matched pair falls short of the cost of creating a vacant job. Obviously, firms
do not create any job in this case.
vt+1 = 0 whenever et+1 < (k − yu)/y. (4)
Conversely, if et+1y + yu ≥ k, or equivalently et+1 ≥ (k − yu)/y, it is profitable for
firms to create vacant jobs as long as they have a reasonably high probability of
finding workers. As the probability of a vacant job meeting with a worker is given
by M(1, vt+1)/vt+1, the expected profit of creating a vacant job is π(vt+1, et+1) =
min
©
Avη−1t+1 , 1/vt+1, 1
ª
(et+1y + yu) − k. For a given level of et+1 ≥ (k − yu)/y,
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π(vt+1, et+1) is decreasing in the number of vacant jobs vt+1, and job creation occurs
until π(vt+1, et+1) = 0 holds. Solving equation π(vt+1, et+1) = 0 gives
vt+1 = min
(µ
A(et+1y + yu)
k
¶1/(1−η)
,
et+1y + yu
k
)
whenever et+1 ≥ (k − yu)/y.
(5)
To summarize, the fraction of educated workers et+1 determines the number of
vacant jobs created by firms vt+1, which in turn aﬀects the probability of each worker
finding a job. Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) gives
qt+1 = Q(et+1) ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 for et+1 < (k − yu)/y,
min {m[et+1y + yu]α, 1} for et+1 ≥ (k − yu)/y,
(6)
where α ≡ η/(1−η) and m ≡ Aα+1/kα are given constants. Observe from (6) that the
matching probability qt+1 is increasing in et+1. If more children receive an education
in period t, in period t+ 1 firms observe that a higher fraction of workers in the labor
market are educated. Given that this raises the expected revenue from a matched
pair, firms create more jobs in the modern sector and this increases the probability of
workers finding a job.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Rational Expectations Equilibria
Given the number of educated parents in the previous generation et and the expected
matching probability Et[qt+1], equation (1) determines the number of educated workers
in period t+ 1, et+1. Then, as a function of et+1, the actual matching probability qt+1
is determined according to (6). As long as agents are rational, the expected matching
probability Et[qt+1] must coincide with the actual probability qt+1. Therefore, under
a given value of et, the rational expectations equilibrium for this period is given by a
pair of qt+1 (= Et[qt+1]) and et+1 that simultaneously satisfy (1) and (6).
Figure 1 depicts conditions (1) and (6) in (et+1, qt+1) space, given small and large
values of et. In the figure, the schooling locus represents the number of agents who
choose to become educated given expectation Et[qt+1]. The job creation locus shows
the probability of a worker finding a vacant job as a function of et. If these loci
intersect, then it is a rational expectation equilibrium.
Observe that Et[qt+1] = 0 is a rational expectation for any et. If the children in
period t hold a pessimistic expectation that the matching probability in period t + 1
will be zero, no one attends school (et+1 = 0). Then in period t+ 1, and knowing that
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Small et Large et
(Q(1− p+ pet) < βy/z) (Q(1− p+ pet) ≥ βy/z)
Figure 1: Reaction functions and stage equilibria
there is no chance of finding an educated worker, firms do not create any vacant jobs
in the modern sector. Thus, the zero matching probability (qt+1 = 0) is realized, which
verifies that the initial expectation Et[qt+1] = 0 is rational. We refer to this rational
expectations equilibrium as the low-education equilibrium.
When the number of educated parents is suﬃciently large (we shortly derive a
precise condition for this), as illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, another
rational expectation exists in which both Et[qt+1] and et+1 are positive. Suppose that in
period t agents in childhood hold an expectation that Et[qt+1] ≥ z/βy. Then, children
in good environments receive an education and become educated in period t + 1; i.e.,
et+1 = 1−p+pet. Observing this value of et+1, firms create vacant jobs, and the actual
matching probability for workers becomes qt+1 = Q(1 − p + pet), where function Q(·)
is defined by (6). Therefore, there is a rational expectation satisfying Et[qt+1] > z/βy
if Q(1− p+ pet) is actually higher than z/βy.
Let us examine when this is actually the case. Note that as 0 < z/βy < 1,7
equation (6) implies that Q(et+1) ≥ z/βy holds if and only if both et+1 ≥ (k − yu)/y
and m[et+1y + yu]
α ≥ z/βy are satisfied. Substituting et+1 = 1 − p + pet for these
7Recall that z,β > 0 and 0 < y < z/β.
9
When Φ ≤ 0 (p ≤ (ye − k)/y) When Φ > 0 (p > (ye − k)/y)
Figure 2: Conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria
conditions and solving for et gives
8
et ≥
k − ye + py
py
≡ Φ, and (7)
et ≥
1
py
"µ
z
βym
¶1/α
− ye + py
#
≡ Ψ(z). (8)
Condition (7) is necessary for the expected profit from a matched pair to be positive.
Given this, condition (8) is necessary for firms to create enough jobs such that children
are willing to receive an education.
Figure 2 depicts conditions (7) and (8) against the opportunity cost of education
z. If et is above the max{Φ,Ψ(z)} curve, expectation Et[qt+1] > z/βy is self-fulfilling:
when agents have a high prospect of finding jobs, many receive an education, which
stimulates firms to create jobs, and the matching probability rises. We refer to this as
the high-education equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 The set of (stage) equilibria in period t+1 is determined by the number
of educated parents et in period t as follows.
(i) When et < max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, the only rational expectations equilibrium is et+1 =
qt+1 = 0.
(ii) When et ≥ max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, there are multiple rational expectations equilibria. One
is et+1 = qt+1 = 0, and the other is et+1 = 1− p+ pet and qt+1 = Q(1− p+ pet).
8In deriving (7) and (8), we used yu + (1− p)y = yu + y − py = yu + (ye − yu)− py = ye − py.
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Figure 3: Dynamics and multiple steady states
4.2 Dynamics and the Poverty Trap
In what follows, we consider the long-term dynamics of the economy. From Proposition
1, the number of educated adult agents et evolves over generations according to
et+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if e < max{Φ,Ψ(z)},
either 0 or 1− p+ pet if e ≥ max{Φ,Ψ(z)}.
(9)
Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of dynamics. We find that two steady-state values of
et exist: the first is a good steady state where all agents receive an education (et = 1),
whereas the second is a poverty trap where no agent receives an education (et = 0).
The economy converges to the good steady state only if (i) the number of edu-
cated agents in the initial adult generation, e0, is larger than the threshold level of
max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, and (ii) for every generation, agents in childhood hold the optimistic
expectation that the high-education equilibrium will be realized when they grow up.
If either of the above conditions is violated, the economy falls into the poverty trap.
Formally, the following proposition and corollary follow from equation (9).
Proposition 2 Suppose that max{Φ,Ψ(z)} is positive.9 If the number of educated
9From (7) and (8), we find that Φ > 0 holds when k > ye − py and that Ψ(z) > 0 holds when
z > βym(ye − py)α. Therefore, max{Φ,Ψ(z)} > 0 holds that either the cost of creating the vacancy
k is above ye − py, or the opportunity cost of receiving an education z is above βym(ye − py)α.
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agents in some generation is below max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, then no agent after this generation
will receive an education.
Corollary 1 Suppose that max{Φ,Ψ(z)} is positive. Even when the number of edu-
cated agents in some generation is above max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, if agents in this generation
hold a pessimistic expectation Et[qt+1] = 0, then no agent after this generation will
receive an education.
Let us explain the mechanisms that jointly create the poverty trap. The first mech-
anism is intrageneration coordination failure. Suppose that agents in some period have
a pessimistic expectation Et[qt+1] = 0, which is always one of the rational expectations.
Then they do not receive an education, and the low-education equilibrium is realized
(i.e., et+1 = qt+1 = 0). Even though this is a worse outcome than the high-education
equilibrium, each agent cannot rationally change their expectation given the expecta-
tions of other agents: if other agents have a pessimistic expectation, one can rationally
expect that other agents will not receive an education and that in the next period firms
observing this will not create jobs (qt+1 = 0). Therefore, we cannot escape this bad
outcome unless all children within the same generation coordinate their expectations
to the high-education equilibrium .10 The other mechanism is the intergenerational
linkage. When the number of educated parents et is low, many children (p(1 − et) of
population 1) are in diﬃcult environments and therefore do not receive an education.
Specifically, given the number of educated parents in period t (et), the number of edu-
cated parents in period t+ 1 (et+1) is bounded above by 1− p− pet, which is smaller
when et is smaller. Thus, the low educational attainment of a generation is partly
inherited by the next generation.
Although the above mechanisms are important, each is not significant enough to
individually explain the persistent poverty and low education found among low-income
countries. The intragenerational coordination problem does not mean that agents nec-
essarily fail to coordinate on the high-education problem; the coordination failure is
merely one possibility among multiple equilibria. Similarly, the problem of an intergen-
erational linkage does not by itself mean that low educational attainment is persistent;
even among children born to uneducated parents, a fraction 1 − p are in (relatively)
10Earlier studies focused on the strategic complementarity between workers and firms because work-
ers and firms determine their investment decisions at the same time (see Laing, Parivos, and Wang
1995; Takii 1997; Acemoglu 1997; and Burdett and Smith 2002). However, firm investment, and
therefore job creation, does not usually take as long as the time required by children to obtain an ed-
ucation. Therefore, we assume that firms choose to invest after they confirm the fraction of educated
workers in the economy. In this case, a strategic complementarity emerges, not between firms and
workers, but rather among children.
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good environments. If they receive an education, the problem of low educational at-
tainment will then be gradually resolved over succeeding generations.
However, when the intra- and intergenerational problems combine, they create a
far more serious situation than can be created by each of the problems alone. Suppose
that there are only a few educated parents (specifically, et is below max{Φ,Ψ(z)}).
This means that a significant fraction of children is in a diﬃcult environment and
therefore does not receive an education. Given this, agents can rationally expect that
in the next period, the fraction of educated workers will be low. Firms will then not
create suﬃcient jobs, and as a result the matching probability will be low. Therefore,
even children in good environments do not receive an education. As a result, and as
shown in Proposition 1, coordination on the high-education equilibrium is impossible
when et < max{Φ,Ψ(z)}. In this way, the intergenerational linkage of low education
necessarily causes the intragenerational coordination failure.
Once intragenerational coordination failure occurs, there are no educated parents
in period t + 1 (et+1 = 0). That is, the intragenerational coordination failure fortifies
the intergenerational linkage of low education (et = 0 means not only et+1 ≤ 1 − p
but et+1 = 0). This induces the majority of children in period t + 1 to choose not
to receive an education, and again causes the intragenerational coordination failure
in generation t + 1, which is inherited by period t + 2, and so on. In this way, the
intra- and intergenerational mechanisms interact with each other, and perpetuate the
poverty and low education found in Proposition 2. We describe this situation as a dual
poverty trap.
Finally, observe that the interaction not only makes the poverty trap more per-
sistent, but also raises the possibility that an economy falls into the poverty trap.
Corollary 1 shows that, even when the initial et is above the threshold, there remains
a possibility of falling into the persistent poverty trap once a generation fails to coor-
dinate on the high-education equilibrium .
5 Economic Policies
The previous section has shown that if et < max{Φ,Ψ(z)}, the economy is dually
trapped in the sense that the intra- and intergenerational problems interact with each
other to perpetuate poverty and low educational attainment. This section considers
the policy prescriptions for escaping from this dual poverty trap.
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5.1 Necessity of Combined Implementation
In a dually trapped economy, the majority of children are born to uneducated parents.
A significant fraction of children are in diﬃcult environments and do not receive an
education. This in turn lowers the number of jobs created by firms in the next period,
which lowers the matching probability for educated workers. Given the low matching
probability, even children in good environments choose not to receive an education. To
resolve this situation, one can envisage several types of policy. One is to induce children
in good environments to receive an education, even when they expect the probability
of finding a job is not very high. This can be through a schooling subsidy and/or
the provision of free education. Another type of policy is to support some children in
diﬃcult environments to remove the barriers to education. This increases the mass of
children who can potentially receive an education and helps children coordinate on the
high-education equilibrium.11
Note that even when these kinds of programs make the high-education equilibrium
possible, the low-education equilibrium (Et[qt+1] = et+1 = 0) is still a rational expec-
tations equilibrium. In a dually trapped economy, children in period t know that the
probability of finding a job in the modern sector has been low for a number of gener-
ations, including the current period t (qt = 0). Given this, they are likely to believe
that other children in the same generation will hold a pessimistic rational expectation
that a similar equilibrium will be realized in the next period (qt+1 = 0).
12 Therefore,
in a dually trapped economy, the above-mentioned policies are likely to be eﬀective
only when combined with appropriate policies that convince children that their lives
can be diﬀerent from their parents.
An example of this type of policy is the Female Secondary School Assistance Project
in Bangladesh, jointly initiated by the Government of Bangladesh and the World Bank
in 1993. In the project, stipends for female students attending school are combined
with a female education awareness campaign, where videos and print materials are
distributed nationally aiming “. . . to promote a supportive community environment for
11Yet another type of policy is to influence the labor market, for example, by subsidizing job
creation. However, in the present setting, where it takes time for children to be educated, this type
of policy suﬀers from a time-inconsistency problem. That is, to induce children in period t to receive
an education, the authority (either a government or an aid organization) must commit to subsidizing
job creation in period t + 1, when these children search for jobs. However, once the agent becomes
educated in period t+1, the authority’s objective has been achieved and it has no incentive to actually
subsidize job creation.
12Rostow (1990) refers to this phenomenon as “long run fatalism,” whereas Hoﬀ and Pandey (2004)
call it “historically created social identities.” Chamley (2002) shows that a similar equilibrium will be
chosen repeatedly, even if there is only a small uncertainty about the structure of the future economy.
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girls’ education through widespread awareness about the merits of female educational,
economic, and social development.”13 Similarly, the World Bank’s Africa division
placed special emphasis on awareness campaigns in enhancing the education of girls in
Mauritania and Guinea (see the World Bank 2000), successfully raising the gross school
enrollment rates of girls in Mauritania to 83.2% in 1997—98 from 39.3% in 1989—90 and
in Guinea to 36.9% in 1997—98 from 21.7% in 1989—90. In the following subsections,
we consider subsidies, free education and support programs in more detail when they
are combined with public awareness programs.
5.2 Subsidy for Schooling: The Case of Φ ≤ 0
Let us consider a subsidy program in which all children that finish schooling in (generic)
period t receive subsidy st, where 0 < st < z. With the subsidy program, the oppor-
tunity cost of education falls from z to z − st.14 For simplicity, we assume that the
expenditure required for this program is covered by foreign aid and/or a nondistor-
tionary tax on agents.
Suppose that the economy is initially in the dual poverty trap: i.e., max{Φ,Ψ(z)} >
0 and et = 0. Can the subsidy on schooling then help the economy escape from
the trap? The answer depends on whether Φ is positive or negative. The following
considers an economy with Φ ≤ 0, which holds when parameters satisfy p < (ye−k)/y
(corresponding to the left-hand panel of Figure 2).
Recall from Proposition 1 that the high-education equilibrium exists only when the
number of educated parents et is at least as large as max{Φ,Ψ(z)}. Note that, when
Φ ≤ 0, the threshold is simply given by Ψ(z). With subsidy st, Ψ(z) falls to Ψ(z − st)
and the locus of the high-education equilibrium extends to Ψ(z − st). In particular,
when z − st ≤ βym(ye − py)α, the locus of the high-education equilibrium extends to
13Each year the awareness campaign distributes about 340,800 brochures, 841,500 calendars, 300,000
stickers, and 3,250 diaries. Awards are given and documentaries are produced, with a total cost of
US$1.7 million dollars. See the World Bank’s web site and search for project ID P009555.
14In fact, the subsidy on schooling works in a similar way to a penalty on child labor. Recall that z
is the income of agents when they are children. If there is a penalty on child labor, and the expected
amount of the fine is st, the expected net income from working during childhood falls to z − st.
This means that the opportunity cost of education falls by the amount of st, similar to a subsidy
on schooling. However, the enforcement of a ban on child labor is generally diﬃcult in low-income
countries and may cost more than the subsidy program. Basu (1999) questioned whether a child
labor ban was eﬀective in eliminating the poverty trap. He also examined the connection between
child labor and adult minimum wages (Basu 2000) and product boycotts (Basu and Zarghamee 2008).
Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) showed that multiple political equilibria arise through the introduction
of voting on a ban on child labor.
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Figure 4: Dynamic eﬀects of a subsidy (Φ ≤ 0)
et = 0, as illustrated in Figure 4. This means that even when the number of educated
parents is zero, the high-education equilibrium becomes the rational expectations equi-
librium. Therefore, by combining subsidy z−βym(ye− py)α ≡ S(0) and an awareness
program to coordinate expectations, the number of agents receiving an education can
be increased to et+1 = 1− p > et.
Note that the subsidy program must continue for some number of periods until
et reaches the initial threshold level at Ψ(z). From (8), it turns out that the high-
education equilibrium exists if and only if
et ≥ Ψ(z − st) ⇔ st ≥ z − βym [(1− p+ pet)y + yu]α ≡ S(et), (10)
where S(et) represents the required amount of subsidy. If the subsidy falls short of
S(et), the high-education equilibrium disappears and the economy reverts to the dual
poverty trap in one period. Observe that S(et) is decreasing in et. This means that
when there are more educated parents, a low subsidy is enough to induce children to
receive an education. Because et grows over generations during the program, equation
(10) implies that the amount of subsidy must be largest in the initial period and then
can be reduced over the generations as et grows. Once et reaches or exceeds Ψ(z),
then no subsidy is thereafter necessary. Even after this takeoﬀ period, children must
coordinate upon the high-education equilibrium for all periods. This is typically not
diﬃcult given that they observe that firms are creating enough jobs for their parents
when they form their own expectations. Over generations, the economy approaches
the good steady state at et = 1.
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5.3 A Two-step Approach with Free Education: Φ > 0
The previous subsection has shown that a subsidy program is eﬀective when Φ ≤ 0. In
an economy with Φ > 0, however, the subsidy program alone cannot save the dually
trapped economy because the threshold is determined by max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)} ≥ Φ > 0.
The locus of the high-education equilibrium cannot extend below Φ > 0 and the
trapped economy at et = 0 cannot switch to the high-education equilibrium.
To see why a subsidy is not helpful, note that from the definition in (7), Φ > 0
means that parameters satisfy p > (ye − k)/y, where p is the fraction of children in
diﬃcult environments among those born to uneducated parents. Intuitively, if p is
high, a trapped economy where all parents are uneducated has only a few children in
good environments. Even when all of these children receive an education, the expected
profit of a firm from a matched job will be negative, and no jobs will be created. In this
particular situation, any partial subsidy for schooling cannot induce agents to receive
an education as there is no private benefit from becoming educated.
In this case, children receive an education only when the opportunity cost of school-
ing (i.e., the foregone earnings while attending school) is fully compensated. Specifi-
cally, suppose that the authority provides ft ≤ 1 − p + pet of children raised in good
educational environments with “free education” in period t. This means that these ft
children receive z in return for attending school.15 The dynamics of the economy now
change from (9) to
et+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ft if et < max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)},
either ft or 1− p+ pet if et ≥ max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)},
(11)
where 0 ≤ st < z represents the amount of schooling subsidy for children not receiving
free education but completing school by themselves. As shown in Figure 5, the locus
of low-education equilibrium shifts up by ft. Recall also that the locus of the high-
education equilibrium can be extended to the point of Φ by a subsidy program. In the
following, we show that the dually trapped economy can be saved in two steps through
the combined policies of providing both free education and subsidies.
Step 1: Suppose that in period 1 the economy is in the dual poverty trap with
positive Φ, i.e., e1 = 0 < Φ. The first step of the program is to induce Φ children to
receive an education through the provision of free education. If 1 − p ≥ Φ, which is
the case when p <
p
(ye − k)/y, this can be done in one period by providing f1 = Φ
children in good environments with free education.16
15Note that ft cannot exceed the number of children in good environments 1 − p + pet because
children in diﬃcult environments will never attend school, even when they receive z.
16 If 1 − p < Φ, it is impossible to choose f1 = Φ when e1 = 0 as there are not enough children
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Figure 5: Dynamic eﬀects of the provision of free education
Step 2: Once the number of educated agents reaches Φ, the provision of free ed-
ucation is no longer necessary (ft can be set to zero). Instead, the authority needs
to subsidize education and coordinate expectations so that agents choose the high-
education equilibrium every period, as in the policy package discussed in the previous
subsection. Figure 5 shows that by providing subsidy s2 = S(e1),
17 Ψ(z − s2) falls
to Φ. This means that the locus of the high-education equilibrium extends to Φ, as
max{Φ,Ψ(z − st))} = Φ = Ψ(z − s2). Then, through an appropriate awareness pro-
gram, the agents choose the high-education equilibrium. The subsidy program must
be continued until et reaches the original threshold level at max{Φ,Ψ(z)}.
Note that while this two-step program is eﬀective, even when Φ > 0, it requires
provision of free education for ft = Φ children in the first step, which necessitates
a lump-sum expenditure of zΦ. Given that z is the entire income foregone while
attending school, zΦ can be a considerable financial burden. Moreover, the recipients
of free education in the first step will not be employed in the modern sector because
e1 = Φ is not enough to induce firms to create jobs, and therefore the provision of free
education has no immediate eﬀect on output. Given this, it may be politically diﬃcult
to persuade the constituency or donor countries to bear a large burden of expenditure.
in good environments. In this case, ft should be increased gradually over the periods, under the
constraint of ft ≤ 1 − p + pet, until it reaches Φ. By choosing ft = 1 − p in period t, et+1 becomes
ft = 1− p > 0, which is larger than et = 0. Then, it is possible to choose ft+1 = 1− p+ pet+1 > et+1,
which results in et+2 = ft+1 > et+1, and so on.
17Recall that function S(·) is defined by (10).
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In the next subsection, we show that the expenditure on the free education program can
be reduced when it is possible to support some of the children in diﬃcult environments
and remove the barriers to education.
5.4 Providing Education Support
We have so far focused on policies to induce children in good environments to receive
an education, as it is assumed that children in diﬃcult environments cannot receive
an education. In low-income countries, children face various barriers to education
depending on their family and social circumstances, and removing these barriers will
require individual treatments. While it is diﬃcult for the authorities to systematically
solve the problem, there are many nongovernment organizations (NGOs) around the
world that seek to support these disadvantaged children. This subsection investigates
how such eﬀorts contribute to saving the economy from the poverty trap.
Suppose that there are NGOs that support children in diﬃcult environments, and
in (generic) period t, they successfully provide educational opportunities with at among
p(1 − et) children in diﬃcult environments.18 These at children act the same way as
the children in good environments, i.e., they receive an education if so doing results
in a higher lifetime income. Thus, in total, there are 1 − p + pet + at children who
are willing to receive an education if the expected matching probability Et[qt+1] is
suﬃciently high. Note that this is the same situation as the case where there are
et + at/p educated parents in an economy without NGO support. (In that case there
are 1− p+ p(et + at/p) children in good environments). Therefore, by replacing et in
(11) by et+ at/p, we obtain the dynamics of the economy in the presence of education
support:
et+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ft if et + at/p < max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)},
either ft or 1− p+ pet + at if et + at/p ≥ max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)}.
(12)
As illustrated in Figure 6, the introduction of education support shifts the locus of
the high-education equilibrium to the left by the amount of at/p. Accordingly, the
threshold level of et falls from max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)} to max{Φ,Ψ(z − st)} − at/p. This
implies that the provision of education support for disadvantaged children can benefit
not only these children, but also children in good environments: that is, if the supported
children receive an education, the number of educated increases in the next period, this
induces firms to create more jobs, and thereby raises the expected matching probability.
18We assume that at is exogenous to the government because there is no systematic way to solve
the problems of troubled families and therefore to increase at easily.
19
Figure 6: Dynamic eﬀects of providing education support
In this way, support for children in diﬃcult environments can even benefit children
already in good environments by raising the possibility of coordinating expectations
on the high-education equilibrium.
In particular, we can show that the introduction of education support can signif-
icantly reduce the financial burden required in the first step of the two-step policy
package discussed in the previous subsection, and through this the policy increases the
financial feasibility of the package. Suppose that Φ > 0 and the economy is in the dual
poverty trap in period 1 (e1 = 0), and it is expected that NGOs will provide support for
a2 children in diﬃcult environments in the next period. Then, in period 1 it suﬃces to
provide free education opportunities with Φ− (a2/p) children in good environments.19
This requires an initial lump-sum expenditure of zΦ − z(a2/p) instead of zΦ. Then,
in period 2 there are e2 = Φ − (a2/p) educated parents. As illustrated in Figure 6,
the locus of the high-education equilibrium can be extended down to Φ − (a2/p) by
the combined policy of providing education support for a2 disadvantaged children and
providing an education subsidy s2 = S(Φ) for all children who attend school. (This
can be confirmed by substituting these values in equation (12). The combined policy
should be further combined with an appropriate policy of coordinating agents’ expec-
tation (e.g., awareness programs) so that they choose the high-education equilibrium
at e3 = 1 − p + pΦ. From the next period on the economy can converge to the good
steady state, even without the provision of education support, as et is already higher
19For simplicity, we here assume Φ− (a2/p) ≤ 1− p. Otherwise, the first step takes several periods,
as discussed in footnote 16.
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than Φ. (e3 = 1− p+ pΦ = Φ+ (1− p)(1− Φ) > Φ).
6 Conclusion
Using a simple overlapping generations model with a frictional labor market, this
paper develops a theory of persistent poverty and low education by focusing on the
interaction between the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment and
the intragenerational coordination failure problem.
We show that the economy may have high- and low-education equilibria because of
strategic complementarity between children of the same generation. When many chil-
dren receive an education, firms can easily find educated workers and thus will create
many jobs, and this justifies children’s choice to receive an education. On the contrary,
if no children receive an education, it becomes diﬃcult for firms to find educated work-
ers, not many jobs are created, and the children’s decision of not receiving an education
becomes rational. In principle, which of the two equilibria is realized depends on the
expectations among children. However, the previous generation’s educational attain-
ment may limit the type of expectation that can be held by the following generation.
When the majority of parents in the economy are uneducated, even children in good
environments cannot hold an optimistic expectation that firms will create many jobs,
because they know that there are many disadvantaged children who will not receive
an education. This may explain the stagnant situation of low-income countries, where
even nondisadvantaged children are reluctant to receive an education: as a result, low
educational attainment is inherited from one generation by the next.
To save the economy from this poverty trap, it is necessary both to make the high-
education equilibrium possible and to make children believe that the high-education
equilibrium will actually occur. When the fraction of children in diﬃcult environments
is not very high, an appropriate policy package is to combine a schooling subsidy
and an awareness program to convince children that their employment prospects are
better than their parents’. However, any partial subsidy for education does not work
when a considerable fraction of children are in diﬃcult environments. In this case,
the authority initially needs to provide complete compensation for the opportunity
cost of education (i.e., the foregone income in childhood) for a certain number of
children before switching to subsidy programs. We also consider the eﬀectiveness of
an education support program for children in diﬃcult environments and find that it
is beneficial, even for those who do not receive the support, because it can raise the
possibility of coordinating their expectations on the high-education equilibrium.
This paper analyzed the situation where two particular poverty trap mechanisms
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previously separately analyzed may reinforce each other. Obviously, there are many
other reasons for persistent poverty (e.g., credit constraints, high fertility, insuﬃcient
capital accumulation, and so on), and low-income countries usual suﬀer from more than
one of these problems, possibly in addition to the problems analyzed here. Our results
suggest the necessity of a comprehensive policy package that should not be simply a
collection of separate actions for each issue, but must be derived from a model that
takes into account the interactions among the underlying issues.
Appendix A: Job Creation when Firms Can Identify Educated
Agents
In Section 3, we derived the job creation curve (6) by assuming that firms cannot distin-
guish between educated and uneducated workers until their vacancies match workers.
Here, we show that a job creation curve similar to (6) can be obtained in the setting
where firms can search only for educated workers and it is more costly for them when
the fraction of educated workers among all adult workers is smaller. (e.g., in this case,
the required advertisement cost will be higher).
Recall that among adult workers of population 1, et+1 are educated in period t+1.
The cost of creating a vacancy and searching for an educated worker for one period
is assumed to depend on the fraction of educated workers et+1/1 = et+1 and denoted
by K(et+1), where K
0(·) < 0, K(0) > ye and K(1) < ye. Similar to equation (2), the
number of matches between the educated workers of size et+1 and the vacancies of size
vt+1 in period t+ 1 is given by
M(et+1, vt+1) = min{Ae1−ηt+1 vηt+1, et+1, vt+1}. (13)
If a vacancy in a firm successfully matches an educated worker, the profit from the
match is ye. Obviously, if K(et+1) is larger than ye, firms never create jobs. That is, if
et+1 < K
−1(ye), then vt+1 = 0. When et+1 ≥ K−1(ye), firms create jobs until the free
entry condition, yeM(et+1, vt+1)/vt+1 = K(et+1), is satisfied.
20 This yields
vt+1 = min
(µ
Aye
K(et+1)
¶1/(1−η)
et+1,
ye
K(et+1)
et+1
)
for et+1 ≥ K−1(ye).
Substituting the obtained value of vt+1 back into the matching function (13) gives
the number of matches in equilibrium. The matching probability of an educated worker
20When et+1 happens to exactly coincide with K
−1(ye), it turns out that the free entry condition
holds within a range of vt+1. In this case, we assume that the firms create as many jobs as possible
under the free entry condition.
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is given by dividing it by et+1, yielding
qt+1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 for et+1 < K
−1(ye),
min
n
A1/(1−η) (ye/K(et+1))
η/(1−η) , 1
o
for et+1 ≥ K−1(ye).
(14)
Note that because K 0(·) < 0, the expression A1/(1−η) (ye/K(et+1))η/(1−η) is increasing
in et+1. Similar to the job creation curve (6) derived in section 3, equation (14) implies
that the matching probability qt+1 is zero for small values of et+1, jumps when et+1
reaches a threshold at K−1(ye), and gradually increases with et+1 until it reaches the
upper bound of 1. When the schooling curve (1) is combined with the job creation
curve (14), instead of (6), we obtain essentially the same results as derived in Sections
4 and 5.
References
[1] Acemoglu D. Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market. Review of
Economic Studies 1997; 64; 445—464.
[2] Acemoglu, D. Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs. Journal of Labor Economics 2001; 19;
1—21.
[3] Antonovics KL, Goldberger AS, Does Increasing Women’s Schooling Raise the
Schooling of the Next Generation? Comment. American Economic Review 2005;
95; 1738—44.
[4] Azariadis C, Drazen A. Threshold Externalities in Economic Development. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 1980; 105; 501—526.
[5] Banerjee AV, Newman AF. Occupational Choice and the Process of Development.
Journal of Political Economy 1993; 101; 274—98.
[6] Behrman JR, Rosenzweig MR. Does Increasing Women’s Schooling Raise the
Schooling of the Next Generation? American Economic Review 2002; 92; 323—334.
[7] Basu K. Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Care with Remarks on Interna-
tional Labor Standards. Journal of Economic Literature 1999; 37; 1083—1119.
[8] Basu K. The Intriguing Relation between Adult Minimum Wage and Child
Labour. Economic Journal 2000; 110; C50—61.
[9] Basu, K, Zarghamee H. Is Product Boycott a Good Idea for Controlling Child
Labor? forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics 2008.
[10] Blonigen BA, Davies RB, Waddell GR, Naughton HT. FDI in Space: Spatial
Autoregressive Relationships in Foreign Direct Investment. European Economic
Review 2007; 51; 1303—25.
23
[11] Bratti M. Parents’ Income and Children’s School Drop-out at 16 in England and
Wales: Evidence from the 1970 British Cohort Study. Review of Economics of the
Household 2007; 5; 15-40.
[12] Burdett K, Smith E. The Low Skill Trap. European Economic Review 2002; 46;
1439—1451.
[13] Chamley CP. Rational Herds. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2004.
[14] De la Croix D, Michel P. A Theory of Economic Growth: Dynamics and Policy
in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2002.
[15] Doepke M, Zilibotti F. The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation. American
Economic Review 2005; 95; 1492—1524.
[16] Easterly, W. Can the West Save Africa? forthcoming in Journal of Economic
Literature 2008.
[17] Galor O, Zeira J. Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review of Economic
Studies 1993; 60; 35—52.
[18] Hoﬀ K, Pandey P. Belief Systems and Durable Inequalities: an Experimental
Investigation of Indian Caste. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3551;
2004.
[19] Kurosaki T, Ito S, Fuwa N, Kubo K, Sawada Y. Child Labor and School Enroll-
ment in Rural India: Whose Education Matters? Developing Economies 2006; 44;
440—464.
[20] Laing D, Palivos T, Wang P. Learning, Matching and Growth. Review of Economic
Studies 1995; 62; 115—129.
[21] Moav O. Cheap Children and the Persistence of Poverty. Economic Journal 2005;
115; 88—110.
[22] Rostow WW. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Noncommunist Manifesto. 3rd
edition. Cambridge University Press; New York; 1990.
[23] Takii K. Jobs, Education and the Underdevelopment Trap. Journal of Interna-
tional Trade and Economic Development 1997; 6; 29—42.
[24] Wakabayashi M. Universal Secondary Education and Diversifying Educational and
Occupational Opportunities in Roi-Et Province in Thailand 1992-1996. Forum of
International Development Studies 1998; 9; 137—160.
[25] The World Bank. Girls Education: The Role of Educational Policies in Mauritania
and Guinea. Africa Region Findings No. 171; 2000.
[26] The World Bank. World Development Indicators 2006; 2006.
24
